Reason and Faith: Kierkegaard, Abraham, and Manoah’s Wife
Kierkegaard’s Abraham
Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard wrote the book Fear and Trembling, discussing the topic of Abraham’s obedience to the divine command to sacrifice his son.
His stance on this most thorny and contentious of biblical moral conundrums – was Abraham’s obedience something to be emulated, was it moral, or was it repugnant? – is not that Abraham simply concluded that G-d is irrational. Rather, Abraham put aside ordinary human logic while continuing to believe, “by virtue of the absurd,” that somehow he would not lose Isaac. The same G-d who had miraculously given him this son at the age of 100, and who had told him, “for through Isaac shall your offspring be named” (Genesis 21:12), could then command his father to put him to death.
For Kierkegaard, Abraham’s choice to surrender his own logic, while continuing to believe that he would somehow receive Isaac back, was at the heart of faith.
Blind Faith
Jews sometimes criticize Christianity for its emphasis on blind faith. Judaism often approaches things rationally, and we have our rational luminaries such as Maimonides. Yet we also have our own strand of thinkers who do not always privilege the rational: our mystics, our teachers who emphasize emunah above reason (though not above halachah). Rebbe Nahman comes to mind. In Likkutei Moharan I, 62:2, he teaches:
For there are different types of questions: There is the question whose solution a man can understand, of which it is said: “And know what [to answer the heretic].” And there is the question whose solution is incomprehensible to the human mind; only in the Future will the solution be revealed. It is forbidden for a person to delve into these. Anyone who does rely on his intellect and delves into them, of this it is said (Proverbs 2:19): “None that go to her return.” This is because for such a question he may not rely on his intellect, but rather be steadfast in faith.
Enter Manoah’s Wife
To this enormous discussion, I want to add one modest piece. There is a biblical character who seems to think that G-d acts in reasonable and rational ways, at least in her context. I refer to she who is known as Manoah’s wife, and is the mother of Samson. Though not even granted a name, she is clearly a refined woman, honoured with a visit by an angel, privileged to be the mother of Samson.
Towards the end of the chapter (Judges 13:20–23), after the angel reveals himself as such by ascending to heaven in the flame, and her husband in terror shouts, “We are going to die because we have seen G-d,” she reassures him with the following words (Judges 13:23):
“Had the Lord meant to take our lives, He would not have accepted a burnt offering and a grain offering from us, or shown us all these things, or now announced to us such things as these.”
You might argue that she simply wants to calm down a terrified husband, but to me her words indicate a genuine train of thought, a small theology of divine reason. G-d has accepted their offering, appeared to them and promised them a son. It would make no sense for G-d to do all of this and then kill them.
*
So did Manoah’s wife hold a different theology to that of Abraham?
That is too strong a statement to make. Her situation is not Abraham’s. Manoah’s wife has not been commanded to do anything, and she does not appear to share her husband’s belief that they are actually going to die. She has the luxury of being able to calmly assemble the evidence and reach the reasonable conclusion.
Abraham, by contrast, is in a terrible bind. He has received two apparently irreconcilable divine communications, promising that his descendants will come through Isaac, and yet commanding him now to kill Isaac (who still has no offspring).
What would this fine woman have done had she been asked, after the miraculous birth of her son, to go sacrifice him? Would she have said to G-d, “Hang on a minute, what You said does not make sense – could You explain?” Would she have thought to herself, “I will do it, because G-d will never let me go through with it”? Or would she have surmised that although G-d generally acts reasonably, there is another level at which the divine is completely opaque to our small minds and has a logic of its own?
In other words, would she:
* challenge the contradiction;
* expect last-minute intervention;
* obey without knowing how the promise can survive.
This last position is closest to Kierkegaard’s Abraham and to Rebbe Nahman’s insistence that faith begins where the intellect can go no further.
We do not know. Manoah’s wife is not being tested in the manner of Abraham: she is not asked to act against everything she knows about G-d’s promise.
Perhaps we simply learn that faith can look reasonable under reasonable circumstances; but under extreme circumstances of apparent divine contradiction, that is when we discover whether reason remains sufficient for us – and if not, what form our faith will take.
* Thank you to my Shalem student Guy Michaeli whose discussion with me on Kierkegaard, while I was teaching the Samson story through Bibliodrama, led to the writing of this post.
Abraham,
Akeda,
Kierkegaard,
Manoah's wife,
faith,
reason 